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 "LESS FILLING, TASTES GREAT"
 The Realist-Neoliberal Debate
 By EMERSON M. S. NIOU and PETER C. ORDESHOOK*
 T HE debate between realists and neoliberals focuses on two issues:
 (1) delineating the goals that best account for the actions of states,
 especially patterns of cooperation and conflict; and (2) assessing whether
 institutions of different types can ameliorate conflict in an otherwise an-
 archic environment. Realists for their part concede that states may be
 concerned in the long run with absolute welfare; but they also believe
 that states, faced with inevitable threats to their survival, must concern
 themselves with relative position as measured by military capability, eco-
 nomic productivity, and the like thereby attenuating the likelihood of
 cooperation and the role of institutions as facilitators of cooperation.
 Neoliberals, by contrast, draw on the lessons of scenarios such as the
 repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and the myriad instances of actual coop-
 eration in international politics and hence see less reason for supposing
 that states are concerned necessarily with relative gain. Consequently,
 they see greater opportunity for cooperation and an expanded role for
 institutions as facilitators of that cooperation.
 This debate remains unresolved. Thus, out of frustration or a belief
 that logical argument cannot settle the matter, some look for answers
 from empirical evidence: "The next scholarly task is to conduct tests of
 the two approaches."' We argue here, however, that this conclusion is
 premature. First, we cannot formulate a critical test of these two ap-
 proaches, because both sides of the debate speak more in terms of general
 tendencies and employ concepts (for example, power, regime, hegemon,
 relative gain) that, although treated as theoretical primitives, are too im-
 precise to lend themselves to discriminating hypotheses. Second, neither
 a theoretical nor an empirical focus on state goals can make the decisive
 theoretical contribution. Aside from some specification of "basic" goals
 such as that each state prefers to maximize the welfare of its society,
 understanding international politics does not require a prior determina-
 * This research was supported in part by a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace. We also
 wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticisms of Tom Schwartz, Peter Lange,
 and Joseph Grieco.
 I Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
 Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), 503.
 World Politics 46 (January 1994), 209-34
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 tion of instrumental goals. Such goals must be endogenous to any theory
 that might resolve the debate. Finally, although generality is sought with
 appeals to ideas drawn from the rational-choice paradigm and game the-
 ory in particular, both sides misconstrue the content of those ideas or
 draw misleading implications from them. Nevertheless, we can discern
 a general perspective in which the debate is transformed from an incon-
 clusive discussion of goals into a more productive assessment of the like-
 lihood that states will coordinate cooperatively or competitively, where
 this likelihood depends on things such as prior subjective beliefs, chance
 events, and the ease with which states can signal their intentions.
 Elaborating these arguments, we begin in Section I with two uncon-
 troversial propositions: that states share the basic goal of absolute welfare
 maximization (as measured by some calculation of the "resources" at its
 disposal) and that they become concerned about their position relative to
 other states only when circumstances establish such a concern as instru-
 mental to realizing basic objectives. To be productive, the realist-neo-
 liberal debate over the implications of these two propositions must con-
 sider the analysis of equilibria of complete systems in which instrumental
 goals and circumstances are jointly and simultaneously determined,
 rather than argue whether anarchic systems necessarily imply an instru-
 mental goal of relative resource maximization, whether the possibility of
 cooperation allows for the maximization of absolute resources, or
 whether relative resource maximization implies the outcomes that real-
 ists foresee. Instead of supposing that we must choose between modeling
 states as maximizers of absolute or relative gain, these instrumental goals
 should be treated merely as part of the description of the equilibria that
 systems of countries can achieve.
 Next, we argue in Section II that although metaphorical appeals to
 parts of game theory like the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and the Battle
 of the Sexes illustrate fundamental aspects of cooperation in anarchic
 systems, we need to take advantage of more general principles to achieve
 a general understanding of when a world order corresponding to the one
 envisioned by realists is likely to prevail and when that envisioned by
 neoliberals is more likely. Because virtually every ongoing social process
 possesses a multiplicity of equilibria, opportunities to cooperate and the
 concomitant problem of coordinating to one of these equilibria are om-
 nipresent. If cooperation involves the joint selection of strategies that
 avoid mutually disadvantageous outcomes in favor of an advantageous
 equilibrium relative to the status quo or vector of individual security
 values,2 and if coordination is the selection of a particular equilibrium on
 2 See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
 1984), 54.
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 the basis of individual beliefs about actions that derive from something
 other than the abstract properties of that equilibrium, then for broad
 classes of circumstances, cooperation cannot be expected to occur reliably
 without coordination.
 It follows that the study of those things that facilitate or impede co-
 ordination is a necessary feature of any theory of international processes.
 Indeed, Section III emphasizes that the concept of coordination already
 plays a central role in international relations theory insofar as that theory
 conceptualizes the institutions and regimes that service wholly coopera-
 tive arrangements and those that service more conflictual world orders
 as mechanisms for coordinating states to particular outcomes or as man-
 ifestations of coordination.3 We also argue in this section that domestic
 and international politics are not, as is oftentimes asserted, conceptually
 distinct. It is incorrect to hold that international affairs are anarchic and
 that domestic affairs are something else; rather, the appearance of differ-
 ence derives from the extent to which coordination occurs at one level of
 human interaction and not at another.
 To have any confidence in our arguments, however, we must be cer-
 tain that the different world orders identified by realists and neoliber-
 als-those in which states are concerned primarily with survival and
 relative gains versus those in which states cooperate on a more compre-
 hensive basis and pursue absolute gains, respectively-can coexist as
 equilibria in the same general model. That would allow us to explore the
 circumstances under which one equilibrium or the other might be more
 attractive. To that end, in Section IV we review a specific model of an-
 archic systems in which those world orders do coexist.
 The central premise of this essay is that the realist-neoliberal debate
 can yield a general theory only if it is recast to focus on the likelihood
 that states will coordinate to achieve equilibria of different types. The
 argument over the type of international system that prevails and the in-
 strumental goals of states is an argument over whether states are more
 likely to coordinate to wholly noncooperative outcomes, to partially co-
 operative outcomes characterized by competing alliances, or to wholly
 cooperative outcomes such as an all-encompassing system of collective
 security. Within these world orders, we should also examine how states
 I For relevant examples of an understanding of the centrality of coordination to interna-
 tional politics, see Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Forma-
 tion," World Politics 32 (April 1980); Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration:
 Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982); Duncan Snidal,
 "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and
 Regimes," American Political Science Review 79 (September 1985); Stephen D. Krasner,
 "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics
 43 (April 1991); Geoffrey Garrett, "Power Politics and European Integration" (Mimeo, Stan-
 ford University, 1992).
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 enhance the attractiveness of different equilibria, how they signal com-
 mitments to the strategies that lead to them, and ultimately how coop-
 eration and conflict across different issue-areas reinforce or undermine
 the alternative world orders that characterize the interactions of states
 generally.
 I. GOALS AS ENDOGENOUS
 The dispute over goals is summarized by the following assertions: from
 one side that "in a self-help system, considerations of security subordi-
 nate economic gain to political interest"4 and more ambiguously from
 the other side that "under different systemic conditions states will define
 their self-interest differently. Where survival is at stake efforts to
 maintain autonomy may take precedence over all other activities; but
 where the environment is relatively benign energies will also be directed
 to fulfilling other goals."5 Of course, the issue of goals is secondary to the
 issue of whether cooperation can emerge and be sustained in an anarchic
 environment, that is, in an environment in which agreements among
 countries to abide by particular strategies cannot be maintained by ex-
 ogenous mechanisms of enforcement. Instead, such agreements must be
 maintained, if they can be at all, by the individual self-interest of those
 who are party to them. In game-theoretic terms, cooperative outcomes
 must correspond to an equilibrium to the noncooperative game that
 models choice sequences, information, and the relation of outcomes to
 the choices countries confront.
 The lesson of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma that the absence of
 exogenous enforcement need not preclude cooperation, including that
 which encompasses all persons-confronts realists with a special chal-
 lenge and imparts to the issue of goals its apparent relevance.6 Corre-
 spondingly, realists meet this challenge with the argument that the di-
 lemma does not model the core of international politics. This argument
 is defended, in turn, by the view that the imperatives of anarchic systems
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 107.
 Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
 Press, 1989), 62. Of course, any such discussion should contend with the difficulties associated
 with attributing goals to collectivities; see, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
 Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). Nevertheless, the concept of the state as a
 rational unitary decision maker remains a convenient abstraction that allows us to ignore
 temporarily how international affairs affect domestic politics and how domestic politics trans-
 forms the goals of individuals into state actions.
 6 Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); Robert Axelrod, The
 Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod and Robert 0.
 Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," in Kenneth A. Oye. ed., Cooperation
 under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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 compel states to be primarily concerned with relative gains. As Powell
 summarizes the realist view, "If. . . one state can turn a relative gain to
 its advantage and the disadvantage of others, then [the system's con-
 straints] will induce a concern for relative gains and this may impede
 cooperation absent any superior authority to ensure that these gains not
 be used in this way."7 Thus, in the realist view, the imperatives of sur-
 vival confront states with a security dilemma and not a Prisoners' Di-
 lemma-with a dilemma that admits of the elimination of subsets of
 states rather than merely some inefficient outcome. This compels states
 to be primarily concerned with relative gain, which renders competition
 constant sum and in turn precludes all but limited cooperation.
 Thus, we can restate the realist-neoliberal debate. First, since the de-
 bate is largely over the instrumental goals states pursue as a function of
 their environment, we can assume that both realists and neoliberals ac-
 cept the following proposition:
 PI. A state's fundamental goal is absolute welfare maximization, which,
 ignoring the complexities introduced by contemporary social choice the-
 ory, can be operationalized in terms of the maximization of some aggre-
 gate measure of the resources at a country's disposal. However, a state may
 act as if it pursues other objectives whenever circumstances require it do
 so to achieve this goal.
 To this assumption realists and most neoliberals add the proposition that
 "domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. . . . International sys-
 tems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two
 structures are distinctly different, indeed, contrary to each other."8 That
 is,
 P2. International affairs differ from domestic affairs in that interna-
 tional affairs lack (exogenous) mechanisms for enforcing agreements.
 On the basis of PI and P2, the realist argument, stated starkly, becomes:
 P3. The anarchic environment of international politics compels states to
 be concerned at all times with survival, which requires that they supplant
 the pursuit of absolute welfare maximization with the instrumental goal
 of relative resource maximization.
 P4. A concern with relative resource maximization renders the lessons
 of the Prisoners' Dilemma irrelevant and makes cooperation, except in the
 form of competing alliances, impossible or merely temporary.
 7Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," Amer-
 ican Political Science Review 85 (December 1991), 1306.
 8 Waltz (fn. 4).
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 Neoliberals, on the other hand, substitute these propositions for P3 and
 P4:
 P3'. In those instances in which the mutual (absolute) gains from coop-
 eration are sufficiently great, the Prisoners' Dilemma teaches us that the
 absence of exogenous mechanisms of enforcement does not preclude effec-
 tive cooperation.
 P4'. Although survival may take precedence over all other activities, at
 other times states can pursue other goals.
 Much of the debate over goals can be set in the context of these prop-
 ositions, and doing so reveals the incompleteness of both arguments.
 First, consider P4 and the assertion that "under zero-sum conditions
 there is no basis for regimes and no reason to coordinate policies, because
 one actor's loss is another's gain."9 Not only is this assertion wrong for
 scenarios with more than two people (since a subset of people can gain
 at the expense of others), but it is also suspect for two-person situations.
 We can of course make cooperation impossible by transforming the Pris-
 oners' Dilemma in Game 1 to Game 2 (see Figure 1) with the assumption
 that players maximize payoff differences. However, suppose states also
 consider absolute resources at the margin; that is, suppose they have lex-
 icographic preferences and thus consider absolute position when they are
 otherwise indifferent about their relative position. Then the ordinal util-
 ities in Game 3 describe the preference of both players. Notice now that
 Game 3 is also a Prisoners' Dilemma. Hence, even a minor "adjustment"
 in the assumption that states maximize relative position readmits the
 possibility of cooperation.
 Such examples alert us to the fact that conclusions about cooperation
 depend on how goals are modeled. This problem is compounded, more-
 over, by the inherent ambiguity in formalizing relative resource maxi-
 mization when the number of countries exceeds two. For example, ig-
 noring how the Ri's are defined or measured, let (R1, R2, . . . Rj) denote
 the resources controlled by countries 1, 2, . n. Then perhaps the most
 straightforward way to formalize relative gain maximization is to as-
 5,5 20,0 0,0 20, -20 2,2 4,1
 0,20 10,10 -20,20 0,0 11,4 3,3
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
 FIGURE 1
 9 Krasner (fn. 3), 338.
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 sume that state i simply maximizes its proportion of resources in the
 system; that is,
 Ri.
 En=j R.
 However, to facilitate the derivation of results, Snidal formulates this
 goal as the maximization of the following function:1"
 Ri _ Ej *1 R
 n
 Both formulations, though, ignore the possibility that i's proportion of
 resources can increase even as another country surpasses i. Hence, rather
 than being concerned with averages, country i might be concerned with
 its position relative to the largest country in the system and thereby max-
 imize,
 Ri- MAXj,, [Re]
 Alternatively, why not suppose that country i focuses its attention on
 some subset of countries those near its borders or outside of its alli-
 ance and thereby maximizes its position relative to the largest country
 in this subset?
 Certainly, we can imagine other formulations that are consistent with
 the hypothesis that countries maximize relative resources. But because,
 as the discussion of Games 1-3 reveals, conclusions may depend on how
 we formalize things and because there is ambiguity about the "correct"
 formulation, we can see that basing a model on some specific formaliza-
 tion is unlikely to be productive. Because, in accordance with proposition
 Pi, the goals we observe are derivative of circumstances, the appropriate
 formulation can be discerned only from a more comprehensive theory
 that allows us to derive the algebraic representation of instrumental goals
 from the primary ones of survival and absolute resource maximization.
 This raises a problem that neither the realist nor the neoliberal argu-
 ment addresses fully: that "national policies both influence and are influ-
 enced by the types of world order which prevails at the time."11 That is,
 the degree to which a state must concern itself with relative resources
 depends on the willingness of other states to cooperate; but that willing-
 ness is itself dependent on the goals of other states, which depend on the
 goal and actions of the state in question, and so on.
 10 Duncan Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," Inter-
 national Studies Quarterly 35 (December 1991).
 11 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965),
 1493.
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 To restate Wright's argument and to identify what is missing from or
 unstated in the arguments summarized by P3-P4 and P3'-P4', suppose
 G = G(E) denotes the dependence of goals on the environment a state
 confronts, where that environment includes descriptions of the capabili-
 ties of states, the choices they confront, domestic political constraints and
 responses to international events, and beliefs about the choices that others
 will make in the future. But notice that if the environment includes the
 strategies of countries in the system (for example, military preparations,
 alliances, trade policies), which are themselves dependent on goals, then
 E is a function of G and we must write E = E(G). It follows that we
 cannot solve separately for G or E. Instead, we must solve for both vari-
 ables simultaneously because the consequences of goals and of alternative
 environmental conditions are identified only by solving for an equilib-
 rium value of these variables. That is, we must find those [G*, E*] such
 that if E* is the environment of states, then states act as if their goals are
 G = G(E*); and if G* denotes the goals of states, then they choose
 strategies such that E* = E(G*) pertains. And because there is no reason
 to suppose that such equilibria are unique, it also follows that we must
 learn (1) whether the interaction of states is likely to lead to an equilib-
 rium, (2) how the character of an equilibrium depends on other things
 such as the initial beliefs of decision makers, and (3), in general, the cir-
 cumstances under which one equilibrium is selected over another or
 whether in fact any equilibrium will be achieved.
 This argument is relevant to a number of studies that seek to resolve
 the debate in favor of one side or the other. Snidal, for example, purports
 to show that assumption P4 is erroneous that the realists' predictions
 about the impossibility of cooperation do not follow from their assump-
 tions about goals."2 Snidal's argument is flawed, however, in that he fails
 to allow the resulting strategic imperatives to influence the determinants
 of goals. In his notation, the weight r given to relative resource maximi-
 zation ought to be made functionally dependent on the environment that
 r helps establish. Assuming that r is an exogenously determined constant
 allows for only a partial and necessarily inconclusive argument.
 By contrast, Krasner defends the view that "power needs to be given
 pride of place" within the neoliberal framework. He argues that in prop-
 osition P3' neoliberals give too much weight to the resolution of "market
 failure" and too little to the bargaining among states that determines
 which Pareto-efficient outcome prevails.'3 Interactions among states are
 12 Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," Ameri-
 can Political Science Review 85 (September 1991).
 13 Krasner (fn. 3), 366.
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 not exclusively concerned with ensuring Pareto efficiency; they can also
 be a competition for advantage in which power determines final out-
 comes. However, if we accept Krasner's definition of power as "the abil-
 ity to determine who plays the game, or to define the rules, or to change
 the values within the payoff matrix," then generalizing his analysis re-
 quires a model of a more inclusive game in which players select these
 parameters."4 For example, the idea that power determines the ability to
 influence bargaining outcomes establishes power as an instrumental vari-
 able whose weight is dictated by its value with respect to realizing some
 more basic goal. It follows that Krasner's argument is incomplete. Al-
 though he is convincing in his empirical analysis that there is at least one
 equilibrium environment E* in which G* = {power maximization}, we
 cannot be certain that this equilibrium is unique until we specify a stra-
 tegic environment in which states choose (implicitly or explicitly) to
 make decisions on the basis of power. Such an environment models an-
 archic systems and renders E and G endogenous.
 Powell avoids ad hoc formulations of goals and approaches this theo-
 retical ideal by offering a specific mechanism that renders goals endoge-
 nous.15 But even his analysis, which formalizes P4', is incomplete (delib-
 erately so, since his objective is merely to show how the goal of absolute
 gain is rationally transformed into a concern with relative gain). The
 determinants of goals are the "constraints defining the system [that] cre-
 ate opportunities for one state to turn relative gains to its advantage and
 to the disadvantage of others."116 In addition to technology, these con-
 straints include the actions of third parties, fourth parties, and so on
 (Powell's model is two-person), as well as the institutional structures set
 up to influence those actions. But because such constraints are clearly
 endogenous, Powell's analysis cannot supply any definitive resolution of
 the realist-neoliberal debate.
 II. THE MULTIPLICITY OF EQUILIBRIA
 The preceding discussion argues that goals and environment are endog-
 enous and simultaneously determined, that the realist-neoliberal debate
 takes inadequate account of this fact, and that we are unlikely to resolve
 the debate merely by postulating a goal and seeing if certain conse-
 quences follow from it. Instead, we must formulate a more comprehen-
 sive analysis that renders E and G endogenous. But, in anticipation of
 14 Ibid, 342.
 15 Powell (fn. 7).
 16 Ibid., 1315.
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 what such an analysis is likely to reveal, notice that nothing we have said
 establishes that [E*,G*] will exist or, if it exists, that it will be unique and
 will correspond to the scenario described by either realists or neoliberals.
 Indeed, there are sound reasons for supposing that [E*,G*] will exist but
 that it will not be unique and that this fact suggests a research agenda
 different from the one pursued in arguments over instrumental goals.
 Owing to an initial focus on single-play versions of the Prisoners' Di-
 lemma, political scientists became especially concerned that the absence
 of an effective way to enforce agreements precluded socially rational co-
 operation. Thus, sustaining cooperation as an equilibrium to a nonco-
 operative game by supposing that the dilemma is repeated seemed like a
 critical theoretical result. However, another game, the two-person Battle
 of the Sexes, served to emphasize the relevance of coordination in polit-
 ical processes."7 Referring to Game 4 (see Figure 2) and recalling that an
 equilibrium is a vector of strategies, one for each player, such that no one
 has an incentive to change his or her strategy unilaterally, the important
 feature of this game is that it has two pure strategy equilibria, (albl) and
 (a2,b2), that are neither equivalent (each person prefers a different equi-
 librium) nor formed by interchangeable strategies (combining strategies
 from different equilibria need not yield an equilibrium). Thus, each
 player can choose a strategy that is part of some equilibrium and yet an
 equilibrium outcome does not prevail, for example, the strategy pair
 (a lb2).
 There are two approaches to "solving" the problem illustrated by the
 Battle of the Sexes, only one of which is generally valid. The first oper-
 ates on the assumption that the inability of the analyst to predict out-
 comes or of players to "solve" a game derives from the failure to take
 full account of strategic circumstances, including, for instance, the
 ''power" of players to coerce each other by implementing strategies not
 portrayed in a game. Game 4 in particular appears to confront players
 with a situation in which they might try to assure an equilibrium
 through some process of "preplay" bargaining and in which prediction
 bi b2 bi b2
 al 5,1 0,0 a, 10 ,100 0, 0
 a2 0, 0 1, 5 a2 0,0 1,1
 Game 4 Game 5
 FIGURE 2
 17 See, e.g., Stein (fn. 3); Snidal (fn. 3); and Krasner (fn. 3).
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 requires an analysis of those things that might affect the ability of one
 player to coerce or otherwise influence the actions of the other. Set in the
 usual context of international relations theory, this approach seeks to res-
 urrect the relevance of "power" for situations that might otherwise be
 modeled as nonconstant sum.
 The second approach argues that any expansion of strategic possibili-
 ties would most likely generate larger Battle of the Sexes-type games
 with a multiplicity of nonequivalent, noninterchangeable equilibria. In
 this view, prediction continues to require an appeal to things other than
 formal definitions of equilibria. In particular, prediction requires an ap-
 peal to those things that generate rational expectations initial beliefs
 about choices that are self-fulfilling prophecies (focal points in Schelling's
 terminology).18 Referring to Game 4, suppose on the basis of past behav-
 ior or even the mere labeling of strategies that, first, 1 believes 2 thinks
 that he will choose al so that 2 will choose bI and, second, that 2 believes
 1 thinks that she will choose b, so that 1 will choose a,. Because the
 choices implied by these beliefs are an equilibrium, beliefs are consistent
 and we can say that persons 1 and 2 have "coordinated to (al,bl)." In
 Game 5, which also has two nonequivalent, noninterchangeable pure
 strategy equilibria, consistent beliefs are likely to arise from the attrac-
 tiveness of (al,bl), and so this game seems to have an easily identified
 solution. More generally, though, one must be prepared to find that these
 beliefs and conjectures (these subjective evaluations of circumstances) de-
 rive from a great many things that analysts may not even be capable of
 observing, with the further understanding that "even seemingly trivial
 aspects of the way the game is presented [can] determine the focal equi-
 librium that the players implement.'"9
 Thus far, we have not said much that is new. We want to emphasize,
 however, that because the things the Battle of the Sexes illustrates apply
 to virtually all social processes, the approach just outlined cannot provide
 a definitive general resolution of matters. Support for this argument is
 provided, in part, by any one of the folk theorems of game theory, which
 show that the primary lesson drawn from the repeated Prisoners' Di-
 lemma about the possibility of cooperation without exogenous enforce-
 ment does not require the dilemma for its validity.20 If people give the
 future sufficient weight and if they must choose strategies today that will
 18 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
 19 Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University
 Press, 1991), 113.
 20 Ibid.; and Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press,
 1991).
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 be followed during all subsequent repetitions of some game, then we can
 sustain any utility outcome as an equilibrium in any ongoing (repeated)
 social process, provided only that that outcome yields each person a pay-
 off that exceeds what that person can guarantee from unilateral (uncoor-
 dinated) action. The mechanism supporting this result is that if processes
 are repeated, including processes that allow the players to renegotiate
 agreements at different stages of their interaction, then people have a
 great many strategies (an infinity of them) and these strategies can be
 used to expand the sets of payoff outcomes that can be sustained as equi-
 libria.
 Although these folk theorems apply only to repeated games and share
 other limitations, the analysis of other general classes of games in the
 game-theoretic literature reveals that multiple equilibria characterize
 nearly any relatively complex situation. "It does not greatly matter
 whether it is the Battle of the Sexes that is repeated, or some other game.
 . . . What is important is that the whole spectrum of equilibria becomes
 available as a possible source of social contracts."' To the extent, then,
 that equilibria can be classified as cooperative or noncooperative, the pos-
 sibility of cooperation and noncooperation must be deemed endemic to
 all social processes. If our sole criterion for assessing whether an outcome
 is feasible is whether it corresponds to an equilibrium, then just as we
 cannot preclude outcomes associated with cooperative strategies, we also
 cannot preclude outcomes labeled noncooperative.
 These facts, then, support the view that the first approach to resolving
 Battle of the Sexes-type issues expanding the strategies available to
 players by incorporating more things into the analysis is unlikely to
 meet with much success. Trying to achieve an unambiguous prediction
 by incorporating preplay bargaining and considerations of power (espe-
 cially if the expansion allows infinite sequences of moves or an uncertain
 number of finite sequences) is more likely to result in an increase in the
 number of equilibria, thereby complicating the task of predicting
 whether and how players will coordinate to any one equilibrium. Cor-
 respondingly, these facts establish that states are unlikely to cooperate if
 they cannot also coordinate, since without coordination there is no reason
 to suppose that any equilibrium will be achieved. Finally, prediction and
 explanation requires not only that we learn the strategies that support
 different outcomes but that we also learn how states coordinate and
 whether the requirements to coordinate to one type of equilibrium differ
 from the requirements to coordinate to another type.
 21 Ken Binmore, "Game Theory and the Social Contract I: Playing Fair" (Mimeo, Uni-
 versity of Michigan, 1992).
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 III. COORDINATION, CONSTITUTIONS, AND REGIMES
 If the problem of coordination is as pervasive as suggested here, then at
 least two things should be true. First, this problem should manifest itself
 in all social processes, not merely in international ones. Second, this prob-
 lem should, in one form or another, be recognized in the literature on
 international relations, or at least one should be able to reinterpret a good
 part of that literature in terms of the problem of coordination.
 With respect to the first thing, let us reconsider the validity of propo-
 sition P2: why does the concept of power seem less central in domestic
 affairs than it does in international affairs, and do the means whereby
 people coordinate provide an alternative explanation for the appearance
 of a difference between international and domestic affairs? With respect
 to domestic politics, at one level we could attempt to account for policy
 outcomes in, say, a democratic society by referring to the power of inter-
 est groups, the media, the courts versus the legislature, or the legislature
 versus the executive. But closer inspection would reveal that many of the
 things associated with power or its determinants derive, whether implic-
 itly or explicitly, from a constitution that defines the rules of "legitimate"
 political action. Presidential power derives from the manner in which
 that office is filled and from that office's ability to marshal public opin-
 ion; legislative power derives from the constitutional authority to tax and
 make law; and interest group power, from its ability to facilitate the
 reelection of legislators according to constitutionally prescribed rules,
 and so on. Thus, understanding domestic politics in terms of a specific
 constellation of power requires an understanding of why society's mem-
 bers implicitly or explicitly accede to the terms of a constitution that
 helps define and allocate power.
 Of course, like international relations theorists, constitutional theorists
 are also concerned with the matter of endogenous enforcement how a
 constitution's provisions are sustained, how a "piece of parchment" can
 contribute to political stability, and how correspondingly such a docu-
 ment can establish power relationships. The endogenous enforcement of
 constitutional provisions, like the issues that ostensibly separate realists
 and neoliberals, has long been debated owing to the seemingly paradox-
 ical requirement that stable constitutions enforce themselves.
 The essence of this paradox and the corresponding source of the temp-
 tation to account for stability in terms of power relations is revealed if
 we attempt to conceptualize a constitution as a contract that sets the
 terms of a market exchange.22 Viewing a constitution thus necessarily
 22 Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (New York: Cambridge
 University Press, 1985).
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 leads to the question of who or what enforces the contract. That, in turn,
 leads to the search for the ultimate source of enforcement authority in
 society. But answering that the courts, the legislature, or the imperatives
 of electoral competition are the source of enforcement only pushes the
 problem back: who, one then asks, enforces the court's prerogatives, the
 legislature's jurisdiction, or the laws that regulate elections?
 At least at the constitutional level, then, a state is in principle no less
 anarchic than an international system in the sense that the enforcement
 of constitutional agreements must be endogenous. Nevertheless, domes-
 tic and international politics appear distinct by virtue of the fact that
 being a state requires that people achieve some minimal level of coordi-
 nation with respect to the implicit or explicit rules of domestic social
 process. Without denying the relevance of social norms, custom, and cul-
 ture, even if we restrict our attention to formalized "democratic" rules,
 there are a great many alternative equilibria of rules. Thus, to realize the
 mutual benefits of a stable and coherent political system, the members of
 society must select one of these equilibria and thereby establish a stable
 set of expectations about legitimate process for the present and the fu-
 ture. Written constitutions are a route to that end.
 It follows that constitutions are best conceptualized as mechanisms
 that coordinate society to an equilibrium of rules.23 A constitution is sta-
 ble and self-enforcing if it establishes a set of self-fulfilling expectations
 about due process, rights, and legitimate ways of making collective de-
 cisions. Moreover, conceptualizing constitutions in this way shows them
 to be part of the social fabric that coordinates society in general, as part
 of the regime that describes society and the state. And it leads to more
 practical questions such as how to craft rules to compete with other
 things that can coordinate social action (for example, ethnicity, religion,
 language).
 It is true that the salience of the issue of exogenous enforcement fades
 once a constitution becomes a stable part of society. At that point, stu-
 dents of domestic politics can attend to other matters such as the details
 of judicial, legislative, or electoral process without regard to how the
 rules specifying the roles of judiciary, legislature, or elections are ulti-
 mately enforced. Lurking in the background, however, is the fact that
 the rules defining these branches and their power are sustained because
 acceptance of them describes some of the elements of social coordination.
 23 David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
 1969); Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds.,
 The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); and
 Peter C. Ordeshook, "Constitutional Stability," Constitutional Political Economy 3 (1992).
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 Of course, realists might make the case that international and domes-
 tic politics are distinct by arguing that power dictates outcomes in pre-
 constitutional societies and that an international system is best described
 as such a society. Correspondingly, restating Krasner's argument, power,
 rather than some implicit adherence to rules, structures coordination.24
 Aside from noting that we have never observed a "state of nature" in
 which people act on some basis other than beliefs about the actions of
 others in a wholly uncoordinated fashion, we can also reassert our pre-
 vious conclusion that such an expansion of considerations is more likely
 to expand the set of equilibria in our analysis than it is to provide any
 resolution of matters. For example, suppose, in asking how tyrants en-
 force their edicts, we respond: "Through coercion administered by the
 military or the police." But then we must ask: "Why do the military and
 police follow?" and our answer is "Because, given their private motives,
 the tyrant coordinates their actions to those ends better than any other
 entity." Even if everyone prefers to defect, they need not do so unless
 another coordinator (revolutionary leader) appears, because each person
 will otherwise anticipate that his or her defection will result in punish-
 ment.
 Now consider a context in which Krasner's arguments seem more
 compelling the period between tyranny and constitutional democracy
 when rules are negotiated. We agree that it is naive to suppose that so-
 ciety in this period is merely "avoiding inefficient outcomes." Even those
 committed to democratic processes will seek a political order that best
 serves their interests. Constitutions are the product of forces in which
 agreements appear to be dictated by some notion, however ambiguous,
 of "relative power." But if we attempt to model this process of constitu-
 tional selection, then the elements of power should be part of that model.
 And barring the unlikely circumstance of a unique equilibrium, we must
 once again appeal to ideas about how people coordinate in order to pre-
 dict the ways in which power will manifest itself. Moreover, as we illus-
 trate in the next section, we can no longer appeal to the concept of power
 to explain coordination, since its components are already part of our de-
 scription of the situation and since it is that description that occasioned
 multiple equilibria.
 The concept of coordination, then, is key to understanding constitu-
 tional stability; it follows from our argument that realists, at least, must
 do more than argue that international and domestic politics are concep-
 tually distinct. Instead, they must explain why they believe that coordi-
 24 Krasner (fn. 3).
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 nation can more readily be achieved at one level of social interaction than
 at another.
 To what extent is the relevance of coordination already understood in
 international relations theory? Consider the concept of a hegemon and
 the reasons why the notion of regime is introduced to explain stability
 and cooperation in a period of posthegemonic decline. Rarely, if ever, is
 one country so predominant that it can impose its will on all states when
 its actions are uniformly opposed. It is more reasonable to view a hege-
 mon as a state that, by its uncommon weight in international affairs,
 coordinates the actions of other states to some mutually beneficial out-
 come or that coordinates punishment strategies in the event one or an-
 other deviates from any agreement.
 In focusing on a hegemon's coordinating function, we see why that
 role need not evaporate in the event of the hegemon's decline. If the
 equilibrium achieved under the hegemon is sufficiently advantageous to
 all states, the ex-hegemon may continue as the primary instrument of
 coordination long after it loses its near-predominant status or even after
 it loses its status as the leading power. What does disappear with the
 hegemon's decline, however, is its ability to punish individual states uni-
 laterally and the expectation that it will do so. Thus, decline before coun-
 tries develop other ways to coordinate can greatly disrupt a system's abil-
 ity to maintain the prevailing equilibrium if that system experiences
 some exogenous shock.
 In any event, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the cooperative
 equilibria achieved under a hegemon is more susceptible to disruption
 after a hegemon declines. And it is at this point that the neoliberal offers
 the idea of "regime" as a substitute for the hegemon's role. Indeed, the
 neoliberal's definition of a regime corresponds nearly identically to such
 a mechanism "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
 decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations con-
 verge,"25 "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, or-
 ganizational energies and financial commitments, which have been ac-
 cepted,"26 "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations
 converge,"27 and "rules of behavior that allow actor expectations to con-
 verge."28 Hence, in a way that is wholly consistent with the requirements
 set by game theory for achieving specific equilibria, neoliberalism places
 25 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
 1983), 2.
 26 John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," Inter-
 national Organization 29 (Autumn 1975), 570.
 27 Young (fn. 3), 337.
 28 Stein (fn. 3), 127.
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 the study of regimes as coordination mechanisms at the heart of inter-
 national relations theory.
 Cooperative outcomes, though, are only one class of equilibria, and
 coordination may also involve disputes over the selection of outcomes
 "along the Pareto frontier"-outcomes that may or may not entail overt
 conflict and the formation of competing alliances. Thus, to the extent
 that the realist view can be interpreted as an argument about the "natu-
 ralness" of coordination to a class of equilibria other than the ones neo-
 liberals envision as feasible, realists and neoliberals are debating the rel-
 ative ease with which states can coordinate to one equilibrium rather
 than another. Realists argue that it is "more natural" to coordinate to
 competitive equilibria (or to equilibria in which subsets of states-alli-
 ances coordinate against other subsets), whereas neoliberals contend
 that institutions of various descriptions can effectively coordinate states
 to different (more universally cooperative) outcomes.
 IV. A MODEL WITH "REALIST" AND "NEOLIBERAL" EQUILIBRIA
 A restatement of the realist-neoliberal debate in terms of coordination
 takes us only part of the way toward freeing the discussion from a focus
 on instrumental goals. We now want to show, in addition, that both
 realist and neoliberal equilibria can coexist. On the one hand, we want
 to assess the argument that realist equilibria somehow impose fewer re-
 quirements on coordination than do the equilibria postulated by neo-
 liberals. On the other hand, we want to assess whether an anarchic sys-
 tem can occasion equilibria in which power plays little or no role in
 addition to equilibria in which power is the central concern of states.
 In searching for an appropriate model, we might begin again with the
 Prisoners' Dilemma. The usual representations of this dilemma do not
 allow for the elimination of states, even though Powell's analysis suggests
 routes around the problem.29 Thus, the existence of a cooperative equi-
 librium there cannot be interpreted as a solution to any "security di-
 lemma" that states confront. Moreover, unless we focus on n-person for-
 mulations and on strategies other than, say, Tit-for-Tat, the dilemma
 can mislead us about the viability of the neoliberal position. Analyses of
 the two-person dilemma focus on two equilibria: a "cooperative" one in
 which all mutual gains are realized through an equilibrium of various
 types of punishment strategies and a "non-cooperative" one in which the
 players forgo these gains and choose myopically dominant strategies. Of
 29 Powell (fn. 7); Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-
 Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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 these two equilibria, one is clearly more attractive than the other, so we
 might conjecture that coordination to it can be realized without great
 difficulty. But realists argue that reality offers states more compelling
 equilibria in which they form antagonistic alliances designed either to
 preclude the dominance of others (balance of power) or to subjugate oth-
 ers. Hence, the issue is not whether countries must choose between
 wholly cooperative equilibria (for example, collective security) and
 wholly competitive equilibria, but whether they can also coordinate to
 equilibria corresponding to competitive alliance structures.
 One approach suggested by these criticisms is to consider n-person
 versions of the dilemma, strategies that allow only subsets of players to
 cooperate, and models that somehow nest Prisoners' Dilemmas and Bat-
 tle of the Sexes scenarios.30 But rather than forcing ourselves into the
 straitjacket of particular scenarios, a more productive approach would
 be to look at analyses that directly model the sources of conflict and co-
 operation, that allow for the elimination of countries, that allow for alli-
 ances, and that allow for collective security arrangements in which coun-
 tries try to ensure against conflict in any form. Thus, it is useful to
 consider Niou and Ordeshook's analysis of cooperation; although a
 highly stylized characterization, it focuses on sustaining cooperation in a
 system in which there are no exogenous enforcement mechanisms.3'
 Moreover, because it does this in a zero-sum environment, this model
 allows us to investigate the possibilities of cooperation that do not de-
 pend, as in the repeated dilemma, merely on there being gains of suffi-
 cient magnitude from trade. Cooperation, if it emerges at all, does so
 because defection from cooperative arrangements is punished by other
 states, each of which must weigh the advantage of participating in a
 punishment versus defecting themselves, conditional on their beliefs
 about the strategies of all other states in the system.
 There is no reason to delve into the complexities of this model, which
 treats technical issues about stochastic games. It is sufficient to note that
 the model begins with the assumption that countries maximize some
 resource that measures their ability to overcome each other and that is in
 fixed supply. The game-theoretic structure of the model assumes that
 countries can propose alliances designed either to threaten other coun-
 tries or to enforce collective security agreements; that alliance partners
 are given the chance to accept or reject offers; that threatened countries
 30 Garrett (fn. 3).
 31 Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Stability in Anarchic International Sys-
 tems," American Political Science Review 84 (December 1990); and idem, "Realism versus
 Neoliberalism," American Journal of Political Science 35 (May 1991).
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 can propose either counterthreats or resource transfers designed to "buy
 off' one or more of the threatening countries; that uncountered threats
 are implemented; that successful counters become new threats; and that
 unless a terminal state (a decision point at which no one has an incentive
 to make a threat), this threat-counterthreat scenario is repeated, possibly
 ad infinitum.32
 Consider the simplest possibility a three-country case since this il-
 lustrates two of the three main types of (subgame perfect) equilibria.
 Specifically, if countries 1, 2, and 3 initially hold the resources 150 > R1
 > R2 > R3 > 0, where R1 + R2 + R3 = 300, then, those two equilibria
 are described thus:
 El. If given the first move, country 1 threatens (150,0,150), 2 threatens
 (0,150,150), and 3 passes or threatens (150,0,150) or (0,150,150). If 1 (or 2)
 offers (150,150,0) as the initial threat, then 2 (or 1) rejects; otherwise, the
 proposed partner accepts participation in the threat. If threatened with a
 loss of resources, 1 (2) transfers to the largest threatening country. If 3 is
 threatened, then it counters with (150,0,150) or (0,150,150) and 1 or 2 ac-
 cepts participation in the counter, in which case 2 or 1 must transfer re-
 sources. The equilibrium outcome is an even chance lottery between
 (150,RI + R2 -150,R3) and (RI +R2 -150,150,R3).
 E2. No state makes an initial threat, but if one is offered, the proposed
 partner "rejects." If the initial threat is rejected, then the "defecting" state
 is punished by being threatened in the next stage (and this threat is ac-
 cepted). If two players defect by making and accepting an initial threat or
 by failing to punish, then play the game as described in El. The equilib-
 rium outcome here is the initial status quo, (R1,R2,R3).
 32 To illustrate this game's structure, suppose there are three countries with the initial
 distribution of resources (120,100,80). Then the sequence of-moves is as follows:
 Step 1. A country, chosen at random, moves first. Suppose this country is 1 and
 suppose it can threaten (150,150,0), (150,0,150), or "pass."
 Step 2. If 1 passes, then 2 moves; and if 2 also passes, 3 moves (all moves parallel those
 of state 1 in the obvious way).
 Step 3. If 1 threatens at step 1, its partner must decide whether to participate in the
 threat. If the partner declines to participate, then 2 moves as in step 2.
 Step 4. If l's partner accepts, the threatened state (2 if 1 threatens (150,0,150), 3 if 1
 threatens (150,150,0)) must choose between transferring resources to 1 or offering a
 counterthreat. Counters for 2 are (0,150,150) and (150,150,0) whereas counters for 3 are
 (150,0,150) and (0,150,150).
 Step 5. Suppose that if 2 or 3 proposes a transfer, it transfers to make 1 indifferent
 between its threat and the transfer. Hence, if 2 transfers, it proposes (150,70,80) whereas
 3 proposes (150,100,50). Assume 1 accepts the transfer to avoid any cost of implementing
 a threat. And suppose that once anyone controls half the resources in the system, the
 game ends, because any subsequent action gives that country the opportunity to take
 advantage of conflicts, to become predominant, and to overcome all states in the system.
 Step 6. If a threatened country instead proposes a counterthreat, its partner chooses
 between accepting or rejecting.
 Step 7. If the counter is rejected, the original threat is implemented.
 Step 8. If the counter is accepted, it becomes a new threat, and as in step 2, the
 threatened player much choose either a new counter or a transfer.
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 The first equilibrium corresponds to pure conflict in which a threat is
 made at the first opportunity and the threatened country, 1 or 2, survives
 only by buying off the largest threatening country. No country is elimi-
 nated, but only because each has sufficient resources to make a "game
 ending" transfer and because no one wants to allow anyone else to be
 predominant. Moreover, extensions of this analysis to n-countries reveals
 that countries can be eliminated or can become more susceptible to being
 forced to make a resource transfer if their resources diminish too greatly
 or if other states increase their resources too much. Hence, in an El-type
 equilibrium, states are necessarily concerned with power and relative
 gain.
 In contrast, the second equilibrium corresponds to an all-encompass-
 ing collective security system in which everyone agrees not to make an
 initial threat and defectors are punished by the remaining countries. Col-
 lective security here need not have a purely military connotation; it can
 refer also to various economic agreements that are enforced by punish-
 ment strategies applied to those who defect from trade, monetary, or
 other such agreements. Whatever its interpretation, cooperation (in the
 form of the absence of threats) is self-enforcing here, because punish-
 ments eliminate the benefits of defection and because administering
 those punishments is rational. In game-theoretic terms, this equilibrium
 (as well as the first) is subgame perfect.
 We also want to emphasize that an E2-type equilibrium exists regard-
 less of the number of countries and regardless of the distribution of re-
 sources. Moving somewhat beyond the confines of the formal analysis, it
 can be reasonably argued that in such an equilibrium states can pursue
 those subsidiary policies that generate mutual gains and, as in domestic
 politics, they can focus their attention on the construction of those insti-
 tutional structures that regulate the Prisoners' Dilemma-type scenarios
 that arise among states outside of purely military considerations. Put
 simply, in an E2-type equilibrium, states need not concern themselves
 with relative gain at the expense of absolute gain.
 Letting (R1,R2,R3) = (120,100,80), the situation that confronts the
 three countries in our example, then, is summarized by Game 6, which
 illustrates the game that results if each country must choose between
 playing in accordance with El or E2 (see Figure 3). For example, if 1
 chooses El and 2 and 3 play according to E2, then 1 offers the initial
 threat (150,0,150), but 3 rejects and 2 and 3 subsequently punish 1 with
 the threat (0,150,150), thereby forcing 1 to transfer resources to 2. Hence,
 we enter (70,150,80) in cell (El,E2,E2). In contrast, if 1 and 3 choose El
 but 2 chooses E2, then 1 and 3 threaten 2 and force a transfer to 1. Hence,
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Mon, 28 Aug 2017 22:39:35 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 "LESS FILLING, TASTES GREAT" 229
 El E2
 El E2 El E2
 El 110, 110, 80 150,70,80 110, 110, 80 70,150,80
 E2 70, 150, 80 110, 110, 80 150,70,80 120, 100,80
 Game 6
 FIGURE 3
 we enter (150,70,80) in cell (E1,E2,E1). If 1 and 2 choose El but 3 chooses
 E2, then either 1 or 2 makes an initial threat (depending on whom nature
 chooses first), 3 rejects, and the defector is punished so that either
 (150,70,80) or (70,150,80) prevails. Hence, we enter (110,100,80) in cell
 (E1,E1,E2). Notice now that this game has the two pure strategy equilib-
 ria, (E1,E1,E1) and (E2,E2,E2), we describe. But like Game 4, these equi-
 libria are neither equivalent nor interchangeable: 1 prefers (E2,E2,E2), 2
 prefers (E1,E1,E1), and combinations of El and E2 are not equilibria.
 Hence, without a way to coordinate, there is no reason to suppose that
 one equilibrium or the other will be achieved or, indeed, whether any
 equilibrium at all will prevail.
 The relevance of this example, then, is this: First, both cooperative
 and competitive world orders (equilibria) can coexist within the structure
 of a single model. Second, since we have already incorporated power into
 the analysis by way of defining legitimate threats and counters, we can-
 not now use power to predict which equilibrium will prevail. Third,
 neither equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the other, so there is no rea-
 son to suppose, as in Game 5 or in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, that
 states will coordinate "naturally" to one equilibrium rather than the
 other because of the relative efficiency of outcomes. Fourth, the existence
 of a collective security equilibrium does not depend on the assumption
 that states maximize absolute gain, nor does a competitive equilibrium
 depend on the assumption that states maximize relative gain both as-
 sumptions are equivalent here because total resources are constant in our
 model. Thus, the resolution of the debate over goals is not, per se, an
 essential step to explaining cooperation or to establishing competitive and
 cooperative outcomes as equilibria. Finally, because states can be elimi-
 nated in an El-type equilibrium (if n > 3) and because only "big" states
 can be beneficiaries of resource transfers, states should be concerned with
 relative resources (or at least with the possibility that their position makes
 them especially vulnerable to elimination). But since states cannot be
 eliminated if an E2-type equilibrium prevails, coordination to this equi-
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 librium allows states to maximize absolute resources. In this way, then,
 the model allows instrumental goals to be endogenously determined as a
 part of the description of the equilibrium that prevails.
 V. THE DEBATE RECONSIDERED
 The preceding discussion reveals that learning how states coordinate to
 achieve one equilibrium rather than another or none at all is an essential
 part of any general theory of international processes. If there are multiple
 equilibria in so simple a model as the one just described, then we can be
 confident that this multiplicity characterizes an even more complex re-
 ality. In fact, if countries in our model can partition themselves into ex-
 haustive and disjoint subsets prior to the game's first move and if we call
 each element of a partition an alliance, then there is a more general class
 of equilibria that admits of a concern with relative and absolute gains,
 and that is described thus:33
 E3. Members of the same alliance then play as in E2 with respect to each
 other, and as in either El or E2 with respect those outside of their alliance.
 That is, an alliance is a collective security arrangement in which alliance
 members are punished for any defection. And depending on an alliance's
 size, it either plays as in El against excluded members (if it is "small") and
 therefore is an "aggressive" alliance, or (if it is "large") it plays as in E2
 and enforces a universal collective security system.
 Thus, in addition to the extremes of an all-encompassing collective se-
 curity arrangement versus one in which agreements are forged at the
 time threats are made, there are intermediate possibilities so that coor-
 dination involves the selection of an equilibrium from a potentially vast
 menu.
 But having thus established that both realist and neoliberal equilibria
 can coexist, the question remains as to whether states can coordinate
 more easily to one type than to another. Hence, looking first at the ar-
 guments realists might muster in support of the view that an El-type
 equilibrium is more likely to be realized, and allowing ourselves the lib-
 erty of moving beyond the strict confines of our analysis, notice first that
 collective security calls for states to "do nothing" until there is a defection
 that warrants punishment. Hence, as the game unfolds, states might rea-
 sonably question whether others are abiding by noncompetitive strate-
 gies or whether they are merely postponing making a threat until cir-
 33 Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliance in Anarchic International Sys-
 tems," International Studies Quarterly 38 (June 1994).
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 cumstances (for example, exogenously induced changes in the
 distribution of resources) are favorable to that purpose (in which case, if
 they plan ahead, cooperation "unravels" and competition prevails).
 Second, although E2 requires that defectors be punished, making the
 first move to punish is rational only if the partners maintain their com-
 mitment to it. Because a collective security equilibrium is subgame per-
 fect in our model, doing so is rational here. But as a practical matter we
 should not ignore the possibility that a defection of one type increases the
 perceived likelihood of further defections, so that defection has an influ-
 ence on beliefs that goes beyond what our current analysis allows. Our
 example, after all, assumes that all countries have perfect foresight,
 whereas if there is something left to chance, then the viability of a collec-
 tive security agreement may be reduced if beliefs are conditional on the
 actions of states as the game unfolds.
 Third, that collective security is an equilibrium means only that no
 state has an incentive to defect unilaterally from the agreement. This does
 not mean that states cannot gain if two or more defect simultaneously.
 For example, if states 2 and 3 defect from (E2,E2,E2) to (E2,E1,E1), then
 2 gains and 3 loses nothing. And, again stepping outside the limits of our
 formal analysis, 2 can presumably reward 3 somehow for its compliance.
 Indeed, if we are willing to assume that states can coordinate to achieve
 one type of equilibrium, then we should be willing to assume that subsets
 of them can coordinate to achieve other ends, including aggressive alli-
 ances designed to take advantage of the compliance of others.
 Finally, the realist can rely simply on the different characteristics of
 equilibria in our model. Although (E1,E1,El) and (E2,E2,E2) are both
 equilibria, (E2,E2,E2) is less stable because it is not strong. If 1 defects
 and threatens (150,0,150), the strategy E2 calls for 3 to "reject" so that 2
 and 3 punish 1. But since 3 cannot gain or lose resources, it is indifferent
 toward rejecting or accepting I's offer. Thus, (E2,E2,E2) is an equilib-
 rium in a weak sense: 3 has neither a positive incentive to defect from
 E2 nor a positive incentive to abide by it. And this weakness may be
 precisely what realists refer to when they argue that even if states agree
 to play cooperatively, they must nevertheless make preparations for a
 more conflictual world.
 This assessment should not be interpreted as unqualified support for
 the realist view, however. Rather, the "weakness" of a collective security
 equilibrium in our model suggests that the equilibria neoliberals hypoth-
 esize (as opposed to the type realists predict) require "strengthening" if
 they are to be realized or otherwise maintained. Indeed, it seems likely
 that the attractiveness of a collective security equilibrium can be more
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 readily enhanced than a conflictual one. There are positive externalities
 in the world that are arguably more difficult to realize when states are
 concerned about threats to their sovereignty. Without modeling such
 things directly, it seems reasonable to suppose that states can coordinate
 to stable monetary systems and efficient trade policies, to name a few
 examples, only when they are not concerned that their partners pose a
 military threat: if realizing mutually beneficial externalities requires nur-
 turing in the form of signals that agreements will be adhered to, then
 competition in a military domain may lead (coordinate) states to act com-
 petitively in other domains. We are not surprised, then, that neoliberals
 emphasize regimes and their institutional foundations. By allowing
 states to coordinate to mutually beneficial outcomes in one domain, re-
 gimes and institutions afford them the opportunity to signal intentions
 with respect to other domains and thereby coordinate actions in those
 domains.
 Of course, realists cannot wholly discount the relevance of institutions.
 Alliances are a part of their argument and institutions can be as necessary
 to the maintenance of a limited collective security arrangement designed
 to meet a common military threat as they are to the maintenance of an
 all-encompassing collective security arrangement. The realists argue
 though, that certain types of alliances and the institutions that service
 them arise "naturally" out of the competition among states and the need
 to ensure one's sovereignty in anarchic systems. The alliances that fail to
 survive are those that do not establish these institutions. The realist view,
 then, has a Darwinian flavor that can be supported only by further anal-
 ysis of the processes whereby states coordinate to achieve different equi-
 libria in the context of a model that allows cooperation as well as com-
 petition.
 The purpose of this essay, though, is not to take a position in the
 realist-neoliberal debate, if only because we know too little about the
 structure of international affairs and the ways in which people and states
 coordinate in complex strategic environments. This essay, then, is less a
 critique of realism and neoliberalism than it is an acknowledgment of
 the fact that once the centrality of coordination and equilibrium selection
 is appreciated, many if not most of the insights and conclusions from
 both schools of thought can be made part of a unified whole and central
 to the construction of any general paradigm. We also want to emphasize,
 though, that the phenomena that concern us are complex and that exist-
 ing modes of inquiry polemical argument, formulation of ad hoc defi-
 nitions, gathering of case studies to buttress one side or the other, and
 generalization based on some specific two-person game appear to have
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 reached the point of diminishing marginal returns. Thus, choosing be-
 tween these two competing schools of thought is at present largely a
 function of the emphasis one chooses to place on different parameters
 and of taste hence, this essay's title.
 It is true that any model of international politics must begin with an
 assumption about goals as an initial operating hypothesis. And despite
 the occasional national leader bent on world or regional domination,
 there is little to dissuade us from assuming that absolute gain is the pri-
 mary goal that, depending on circumstances, can be transformed into a
 derivative concern with relative gain. But we also cannot ignore that the
 circumstances dictating the compatibility or incompatibility of specific
 goals are themselves endogenous and depend on what states believe
 about the beliefs and strategies of other states.
 Recall our discussion of the hegemon's role, and notice that this dis-
 cussion can be conducted without reference to goals. Although what we
 say is predicated on the supposition that each state's fundamental goal is
 welfare maximization, predicting whether cooperation or conflict will
 emerge after the decline of a hegemon does not require a reassessment
 of goals. Instead, prediction requires an assessment of the viability of
 alternative coordinating mechanisms. If a hegemon's decline is accom-
 panied by state actions that are consistent with relative resource maxi-
 mization with a less cooperative and more conflictual environment-
 the explanation for these actions is not that goals have changed, since
 that merely redescribes events. Rather, the observation that states can no
 longer coordinate to the same outcomes as before requires an explanation
 that refers to beliefs, feasible strategies, the relation between strategies
 and outcomes, and the properties of different equilibria.
 It may be true, as Krasner argues,34 that equilibrium selection in a
 posthegemonic system depends on things that we think of as components
 of state power. To suppose that the institutions that emerge to facilitate
 cooperation or conflict do not represent the capabilities of states is un-
 warranted because it ignores the fact that "something" must structure
 international relations. Regardless of the level at which we conceptualize
 matters, then, coordination remains an essential part of equilibrium se-
 lection and the extent to which states focus on relative gain remains de-
 pendent on whether states coordinate to a wholly cooperative or to a
 competitive equilibrium. It follows that explanations of conflict and co-
 operation in systems without a hegemon require an assessment of coor-
 34 Krasner (fn. 3).
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 dination and of the mechanisms required to coordinate to one type of
 equilibrium rather than another.
 Are international affairs so risky that states cannot rely on collective
 security to ensure their sovereignty, or are the gains from cooperation
 sufficiently great that wholly competitive policies are antiquated? Has
 global territorial competition been replaced by competition for economic
 dominance? To what extent is the ability to coordinate sensitive to do-
 mestic politics? Is economic competition conducted by extraterritorial
 entities more benign than other forms? Have institutional inventions and
 the technologies that service them made coordination appreciably less
 difficult? Is the concept of the nation-state itself becoming less relevant
 with the rise of new international actors and forms of international or-
 ganization to shape a world economy?
 Answers to such questions require a coherent theoretical structure,
 and although we do not have the temerity to attempt a description of a
 general theory, we can discern what such a theory would require. First,
 rather than deal with state goals as a primary explanatory variable, it
 should focus on the properties of different equilibria, including their du-
 rability (stability) in the event of accidental deviations and the likelihood
 that they can prevail under different assumptions about system dynam-
 ics. Second, although we may choose to allow power and the pursuit of
 relative gain to influence equilibrium selection at one level of analysis,
 our theory should render such goals the consequence of the selection of
 an equilibrium in some higher or more general level coordination prob-
 lem. Finally, that theory should clarify the role of institutions in the evo-
 lution of beliefs, in coordination, and in the enhancement of the attrac-
 tiveness of equilibria. We should realize, though, that owing to the
 complexity and inclusiveness of the phenomena under consideration, the
 likelihood of producing some all-encompassing, mathematically rigorous
 theory is low. Instead, using basic tools drawn from game theory and
 other fields, we must begin to develop first principles that focus on the
 ways people coordinate strategies so as to achieve and maintain different
 equilibria and to render cooperative equilibria more impervious to error
 and misjudgment.
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